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Is There a Legal Recourse 
Available in New York When the 
Press Fails to Protect the Identity 
of a Child Abuse Victim? 
 
Hon. John H. Wilson* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In October of 2010, while reading through my local 
newspaper, I came across a photo of an eleven-year-old girl, 
next to a headline which identified her as a rape victim. Even 
more shocking, the article which accompanied the photo gave 
the child’s name, identified her residence and school, and 
included details of the acts allegedly committed upon her.1 
I immediately contacted the Office of the District Attorney 
to determine how this information reached the press. I was 
informed that the child had initially been missing, and her 
information had been released to the press in an effort to solicit 
their help in finding her. Subsequently, the child was found in 
the company of an individual who was indicted for Predatory 
Sexual Assault Against a Child.2 
This circumstance led to the question which has resulted 
in this Article—what rights and remedies does the victim of an 
alleged crime have when her identity is revealed by the press? 
 
II.Consideration of Journalistic Ethical Standards 
 
There is no doubt that the publication of the identity of a 
victim of a sexual assault constitutes a serious breach of 
journalist ethics. The Code of Ethics (the “Code”) promulgated 
by the Society of Professional Journalists specifically states, 
 
* In an effort to safeguard the identity of the child, no citation to the 
article described above will be provided here. 
2. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.96 (McKinney 2006). 
1
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under the section entitled “Minimize Harm,” “[b]e cautious 
about identifying juvenile suspects or victims of sex crimes.”3 
However, at the conclusion of the Code, the Society 
acknowledges that “[t]he SPJ Code of Ethics is voluntarily 
embraced by thousands of journalists . . . [t]he code is intended 
not as a set of ‘rules’ but as a resource for ethical decision-
making. It is not—nor can it be under the First Amendment—
legally enforceable.”4 
In 2010, the Crimes Against Children Research Center 
(the “Center”) published a comprehensive study of the impact 
publicity of their status as crime victims can have on children.5 
Citing research conducted over the past thirty years, the 
Center found that the “negative emotional and social 
consequences for victims” included post-traumatic stress 
disorder, depression, and psychological distress “for children as 
well as adults and for both sexual and physical abuse victims.”6 
Noting that “[t]he media community is clearly aware of the 
potential harm for victims in disclosing their identity when 
reporting on crime,”7 the Center also found that “[t]here seems 
to be some consensus in the field that the privacy of certain 
types of victims in particular should be protected.”8 
Nonetheless, in a survey of newspaper articles conducted 
by the Center, which discussed allegations of physical and non-
physical abuse of adult and child victims, the Center reported 
that “[i]n 51 percent of the articles [] reviewed, at least one 
type of identifying information about the child [was] included . . 
. . The most directly identifying source of information, the 
child’s name, was included in 9 percent of the child 
victimization articles.”9 
 
 
 
3. CODE OF ETHICS (Soc'y of Prof'l Journalists 1996), available at 
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp. 
4. Id. (emphasis added). 
5. Lisa M. Jones, et al., Protecting Victims’ Identities in Press Coverage 
of Child Victimization, 11 JOURNALISM 347 (2010). 
6. Id. at 348. 
7. Id. at 350. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 353. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/4
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The Center continued: 
 
While information about children seemed to 
be more protected in articles covering child sex 
abuse, we nonetheless found that potentially 
identifying information was often included. In 4 
percent of articles, the child’s street name or 
address was included. . . . In 12 percent of 
articles, a family member offender’s name was 
given along with information about his or her 
relationship to the child. At least one of the 
above victim identifiers was included in 37 
percent of the articles covering child sexual 
victimization.10 
 
Specifically, the Center noted that one “situation often 
used to justify the use of a child victim’s name is when the 
identity has been previously disclosed; for example, as part of 
an earlier investigation for a missing child.”11 However, 
“additional public identification may indeed cause further 
harm that could be avoided. . . . [A] possible practice might be 
to withhold details about the crimes committed, particularly 
sexual crimes, if a child victim’s identity has been previously 
divulged.”12 
Thus, under the rules discussed above, there can be no 
denying that my local newspaper exhibited an utter disregard 
for the ethical rules explored here. However, it is equally 
inescapable that there is no practical penalty for this conduct—
no, “Discipline Committee” for violations of journalistic ethics. 
There can be no denying that a news provider’s disregard 
for the privacy of a crime victim can have serious consequences. 
In November of 2010, a fourteen-year-old girl committed 
suicide after being bullied by classmates after it was revealed 
in the media that she had accused a classmate of rape.13 As a 
 
10. Id. at 354. 
11. Id. at 361. 
12. Id. 
13. Girl Kills Self After Being Bullied Over Rape Allegations, AOL NEWS 
(Nov. 10, 2010, 5:51 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/11/10/girl-kills-self-
after-being-bullied-over-rape-allegations/. 
3
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result, prosecutors in Wayne County, Michigan were forced to 
drop charges against the accused rapist.14 
“[P]rosecutors did not know [the girl] was being harassed 
until after a local TV broadcast ran an interview that identified 
the girl’s mother. ‘Although the child’s face was not seen, when 
the mother was interviewed, essentially the child’s identity was 
revealed,’ . . . . ‘After the broadcast . . . the child was harassed 
at school.’”15 
What, then, are the legal remedies for a child sexual abuse 
victim, who has had her identity revealed in the press? 
 
III. Privacy Laws and Their Applicability 
 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”16 This principle has also 
been incorporated into the Constitution of New York State, 
which states that “[n]o law shall be passed to restrain or 
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”17 
An action for libel is the usual first choice for an action 
against the press; however, before a private citizen may 
maintain a libel action, a publisher must have “actual 
knowledge of the falsity” of a published statement, or “reckless 
disregard for the truth.”18 Here, in the example from my local 
newspaper, there is no reason to believe the news story is 
untrue, and a truthful news story is protected speech under the 
First Amendment.19 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,20 the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that “actual malice was held to be the 
constitutional standard in determining the libel claims of 
plaintiffs.” 21 That standard was originally applied to public 
 
14. See id. 
15. Id. 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
17. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
18. Doe v. Daily News, L.P., 632 N.Y.S.2d 750, 754 (Sup. Ct. 1995). 
19. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986). 
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
21. Doe, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 754 (citing N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-81). 
Note that the Doe Court was critical of the Sullivan decision, stating that 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/4
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figures; however, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme 
Court extended the actual malice requirement to actions 
brought by private individuals.22 Thus, though the eleven-year-
old and her family may attempt to proceed under the definition 
of libel given in New York’s Pattern Jury Instruction—”the 
statement was defamatory, meaning that the statement had a 
tendency to expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, 
ridicule or disgrace”23—they could not succeed in establishing 
malice. To do that, a “plaintiff must prove that the statement 
was false, meaning substantially untrue” and that the 
defendant published the statement in a grossly irresponsible 
manner without consideration for the standards of information 
gathering and dissemination followed by responsible parties.24 
In fact, even if the statements published in my local paper 
were untrue, when a reporter relies upon statements provided 
by law enforcement, whether sworn or unsworn, and that 
reporter has no reason to doubt the accuracy of the information 
supplied, an action for libel cannot be maintained.25 
The next ground for a civil action to be considered would be 
for a violation of the right to privacy. However, there is no right 
to privacy under the common law of New York State.26 “[I]n 
this State, the right to privacy is governed exclusively by 
sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law . . . .”27 
There are states where a common law right to privacy 
exists.28 Prosser’s Second Restatement of Torts identifies four 
“privacy” torts: “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of 
another,” “appropriation of the other’s name or likeness,” 
 
“Justice Brennan created a doctrine of actual malice based on a less favored 
common law definition which focused on bad faith by the publisher. Rather 
than adopting the common law malice standard outright .” Id. (internal 
citations omitted). 
22. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974). 
23. N.Y. P.J.I. Civ. 3:23A (3d ed. 2000). 
24. Id. 
25. See Mitchell v. Herald Co., 529 N.Y.S.2d 602, 605 (App. Div. 1988) 
(citations omitted). 
26. See Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703-04 (N.Y. 1993). 
27. Id. at 703. 
28. See Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502, 505 
(4th Cir. 1963) (using the right to privacy as a basis for recovery where a 
television newscast identified two rape victims). 
5
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“unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life,” and 
“publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light 
before the public.”29 Thus, there is a considerable body of law 
involving claims against news-gatherers for various forms of 
invasion of privacy outside of New York.30 
Under New York’s Civil Rights Law Section 51, civil 
liability may attach if a person’s “name, portrait, picture or 
voice is used . . . for advertising purposes or for the purposes of 
trade without . . . written consent”31 However, “[t]he use of 
one’s name or likeness in the publication and sale of 
newspapers is considered a First Amendment right of ‘free 
press’ and not ‘trade,’ provided there is a reasonable 
relationship between the individual and the newsworthy 
issue.”32 Thus, the clear and “unmistakable intent” of Civil 
Rights Law Section 51 “is to protect the property right of an 
individual’s likeness from commercial exploitation.”33 
Section 50, and in particular, Section 50-b, is intended to 
prevent public officers and employees from disclosing 
information about crime victims. In fact, Sec. 50-b(1) 
specifically states that “[t]he identity of any victim of a sex 
offense . . . shall be confidential. No report, paper, picture, 
photograph, court file or other documents, in the custody or 
possession of any public officer or employee, which identifies 
such a victim shall be made available for public inspection.”34 
While there is a private right of action for wrongful disclosure 
under Civil Rights Law Section 50-c,35 that section imposes 
“civil liability upon governmental entities that disclose the 
identity of a sex crime victim in violation of section 50-b” not 
non-public employees and organizations.36 
 
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
30. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); see also Nathan 
Siegel, Publication Damages in Newsgathering Cases, COMM. LAW., Summer 
2001, at 11 (“Cohen involved a claim that a newspaper published the identity 
of a source in breach of a promise to maintain [the source’s] confidentiality.”). 
31. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1995). 
32. Padraic D. Lee, Howell v. New York Post: Patient Rights Versus the 
Press, 15 PACE L. REV. 459, 469 (1995). 
33. Id. 
34. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-b(1) (McKinney 2006). 
35. Id. § 50-c. 
36. Fappiano v. N.Y.C. Police Dept., 747 N.E.2d 1286, 1291 (N.Y. 2001). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/4
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Thus, the disclosure in a public newspaper of the identity 
of a child who is the victim of a sexual assault is not actionable 
under New York’s Civil Rights Law. 
There is, however, one possible recourse available against 
a New York newspaper for the conduct at issue here—an action 
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. As we shall 
see, however, this is an extremely weak option. 
The seminal case on this issue is Howell v. New York Post 
Co.37 There, a newspaper photographer trespassed on the 
grounds of the Four Winds Psychiatric Hospital in an attempt 
to take a photo of Hedda Nussbaum, “the ‘adoptive’ mother of 
six-year-old Lisa Steinberg, whose November 1987 death from 
child abuse generated intense public interest.”38 The reporter 
succeeded in his mission, and the resulting photo of Ms. 
Nussbaum was published on the front page of the New York 
Post.39 
The photo included a clear image of Mrs. Howell, who was 
walking with Ms. Nussbaum at the time the photo was taken.40 
Mrs. Howell had taken great pains to conceal her 
hospitalization from her family.41 Thus, once her status as a 
patient at a psychiatric facility was revealed, she sued the New 
York Post for a series of torts, including the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy.42 These 
two causes of action were the only ones to reach consideration 
by the New York Court of Appeals.43 
In considering Mrs. Howell’s claim for an invasion of 
privacy, the court noted the lack of a common law right to 
privacy in New York State law.44 Thus, her only recourse under 
statutory law would be under Civil Rights Law Section 50 or 
51, which, as we have seen, is inapplicable. “[C]ourts have 
 
37. Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699 (N.Y. 1993). 
38. Id. at 700. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., No. 43723/89, 1990 WL 10587771, at *2 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 12, 1990). 
42. Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 701-03. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 703. 
7
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consistently held that the statute should not be construed to 
apply to publications concerning newsworthy events or matters 
of public interest. This is both a matter of legislative intent and 
a reflection of constitutional values in the area of free speech 
and free press.”45 
To succeed under the Civil Rights Law, the plaintiff would 
have to show that her picture “bore no real relationship to the 
article, or that the article was an advertisement in disguise.”46 
Specifically finding that Mrs. Howell had “failed to meet her 
burden,”47 the Court of Appeals found that “there is a real 
relationship between the article and the photograph of 
plaintiff, and the civil rights cause of action was properly 
dismissed.”48 This left only a claim for the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.49 
This was another tort not recognized by the common law of 
New York, “even with physical manifestations—as an 
independent basis for recovery.”50 However, over the years, the 
courts of New York accepted this cause of action, which is 
described in the Second Restatement of Torts as “[o]ne who by 
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly 
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to 
liability for such emotional distress.”51 
The Court of Appeals identified four elements to this cause 
 
45. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
46. Id. at 704. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. We do not discuss the cause of action for the “negligent” infliction of 
emotional distress since, in this context, the courts of New York have roundly 
rejected recovery from the media on this basis. “Recovery for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress would completely overwhelm the whole matrix 
of defamation and privacy torts.” RODNEY A. SMOLIA, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES 
IN MEDIA CONTENT § 8:7 (2d ed. 2010). See Rubinstein v. N.Y. Post Co., 488 
N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (where the defendant newspaper printed 
an erroneous obituary for the plaintiff and rejected the plaintiff’s claim that 
the newspaper “‘negligently and carelessly published false information.’”); see 
also Greenwood v. Daily News L.P., No. 4292/05, 2005 WL 1389052 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. June 7, 2005). The Court in Rubinstein held, “[a] plaintiff cannot 
avoid the constitutional protections afforded to publications by alleging as an 
alternative theory ‘the negligent infliction of harm.’” Rubinstein, 488 
N.Y.S.2d at 333. 
50. Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 701. 
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/4
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of action: “(i) extreme and outrageous conduct; (ii) intent to 
cause, or disregard of a substantial probability to causing, 
severe emotional distress; (iii) a causal connection between the 
conduct and injury; and (iv) severe emotional distress.”52 The 
emphasis, however, has been on the “outrageous conduct” 
element, which “serves the dual function of filtering out petty 
and trivial complaints . . . and assuring that plaintiff’s claim of 
severe emotional distress is genuine.”53 
“Liability has been found only where the conduct has been 
so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go 
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,”54 a 
standard so high that, “of the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claims considered by this Court, every one has failed 
because the alleged conduct was not sufficiently outrageous.”55 
Thus, Ms Howell’s cause of action was dismissed—
”publication [of the photograph]—without more—could not 
ordinarily lead to liability for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.”56 Specifically, the court found that the publication of 
the photograph was “qualifiedly privileged—meaning that 
defendants acted within their legal right” in publishing said 
photo.57 This holds true “even if defendants were aware that 
publication would cause plaintiff emotional distress,”58 since 
“‘the actor is never liable . . . where [the actor] has done no 
more than to insist upon his [or her] legal rights in a 
permissible way.’”59 
However, in language which left open the door to future 
litigation, the Court of Appeals stated that “[w]e do not mean to 
suggest . . . that a plaintiff could never . . . state a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. . . . [W]e need not 
explore today what circumstances might overcome the 
 
52. Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 702. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 705. 
57. Id. at 704. 
58. Id. at 705. 
59. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 46 cmt. g (1965)). 
9
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privilege.”60 
This simple dicta has led to a series of attempts to find the 
“circumstances” which could “overcome the privilege.” The 
cases are legion, but several examples will suffice for our 
purposes here. 
In Howe v. New York Post Co.,61 former New York Yankee 
Steve Howe sought damages for the publication of an item 
regarding his refusal to accept a marijuana cigarette offered to 
him. Even though the newspaper admitted that the item was 
false, the publication of this article did not constitute “extreme 
and outrageous conduct.”62 Thus, Howe’s cause of action for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress was dismissed.63 
In AVA v. NYP Holdings, Inc.,64 the plaintiff, who “was 
born a biological male but has been diagnosed with ‘Gender 
Identity Disorder’ and identifies herself as a female,”65 sued the 
New York Post for an article that revealed the plaintiff’s 
condition.66 While the First Department decision addressed the 
plaintiff’s cause of action for defamation,67 the lower court had 
considered the plaintiff’s claim for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Here, even when it had been revealed that 
she was a he, “the conduct complained of . . . fail[s] to establish 
a separate cause of action for emotional distress.”68 
Recently, in Uzamere v. Daily News, LP,69 plaintiff sought 
damages for the publication of an article entitled, “Hate-
spewing wacko goes into fit in court.” Alleging causes of action 
in defamation, fraud, violation of constitutional rights and the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress,70 the pro se plaintiff 
took issue with “the article’s statement concerning Plaintiff’s 
 
60. Id. 
61. Howe v. N.Y. Post Co., No. 124519/93, 1995 WL 572884 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Mar. 7, 1995). 
62. Id. at *3. 
63. Id. at *4. 
64. Ava v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 885 N.Y.S.2d 247 (App. Div. 2009) 
65. Id. at 248 n.1. 
66. Id. at 250. 
67. Id. at 252. 
68. Ava v. NYP Holdings, Inc., No. 115597/07, 2008 WL 2522631, at *5 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 24, 2008). 
69. No. 403205/10, 2011 WL 6934526 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 10, 2011). 
70. Id. at *1. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/4
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alleged anti-Semitism.”71 
In dismissing the matter in its entirety, the Court noted 
the plaintiff’s publication on her website of “a number of 
postings that, by any objective measure, can only be described 
as virulently anti-Semitic.”72 Thus, “the article’s 
characterization of plaintiff as a ‘wacko’ is a non-actionable 
statement of opinion.”73 
In particular, Ms. Uzamere was unable “to state a claim 
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress,”74 since she 
failed to allege any conduct “so outrageous in character, and so 
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly 
intolerable in a civilized society.”75 
There are instances where the conduct alleged was 
considered to have been sufficiently outrageous to allow 
submission of the case to a jury. Though the First Department 
case of Doe v. American Broadcasting Cos. was a decision 
rendered against the plaintiffs, the dissent by Justice 
Rosenberger is instructive.76 
The plaintiffs in Doe were rape victims who had been 
interviewed for a television news broadcast on the topic of 
rape.77 “The plaintiffs were approached to participate in the 
proposed program. They expressed great concern for their 
anonymity. They received repeated assurances from defendants 
that neither their faces nor their voices would be recognizable . 
. . .”78 Unfortunately, one of the plaintiffs’ employers recognized 
her on a television advertisement for the news report.79 
The majority in Doe ruled that “[d]efendants’ actions here 
did not constitute the intentional, deliberate and outrageous 
conduct necessary” to maintain a cause of action for the 
 
71. Id. at *2. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at *3. 
74. Id. at *4. 
75. Id. (quoting Brown v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 297 A.D.2d 205, 212 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
76. Doe v. Am. Broad. Cos., 543 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (App. Div. 1989). 
77. Id. (Rosenberger, J., dissenting). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
11
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intentional infliction of emotional distress.80 However, the 
dissent felt that the plaintiffs allegations “raises questions of 
fact as to whether [the defendants’] actions were so extreme 
and outrageous as to be regarded as intolerable.”81 
It was not until the decision in Roach v. Stern82 that the 
Second Department revisited and followed the dissent in Doe. 
There, “shock-jock” Howard Stern was sued by the family of 
Deborah Roach, aka, Debbie Tay, a “perennial guest” on the 
Stern show, who had died of a drug overdose.83 A family friend, 
who had been trusted with a portion of the ashes of Ms. Roach, 
had brought these remains to Stern, who proceeded to sift 
through the ashes on the air.84 “[P]articipants in the broadcast 
made comments about the remains while handling various 
bone fragments. . . . Stern at one point . . . held up certain bone 
fragments while he guessed whether they came from Tay’s 
skull or ribs.”85 
The lower court had dismissed the cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotion distress; however, the Second 
Department disagreed. “[W]e conclude that the Supreme Court 
erred in determining that the element of outrageous conduct 
was not satisfied as a matter of law. . . . [A] jury might 
reasonably conclude that the manner in which Tay’s remains 
were handled . . . went beyond the bounds of decent 
behavior.”86 
 
IV.Conclusion 
 
Where then does this leave the eleven year-old victim of an 
alleged sexual crime, who has been identified by name, whose 
residence and school have been revealed, and whose 
photograph has been published by an irresponsible local 
newspaper? Would this be considered “outrageous conduct,” 
“well beyond the bounds of decent behavior?” 
 
80. Id. (majority opinion). 
81. Id. (Rosenberger, J., dissenting). 
82. Roach v. Stern, 675 N.Y.S.2d 133 (App. Div. 1998). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 134. 
86. Id. at 136. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/4
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The case law examined above is not encouraging. The 
allegations, after all, are newsworthy, do not appear to exhibit 
any actual malice, and are actual accusations being made 
against a criminal defendant, who has been indicted. Thus, it is 
reasonable for the publishers of this information to rely upon a 
strong presumption of privilege. 
It is, however, equally reasonable for a jury to be allowed 
to consider whether or not this conduct is “beyond the bounds 
of decent behavior,” and constitutes the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, as occurred in Roach v. Stern.87 
We, as a profession, are bound by ethical rules, which, if 
violated, can lead to disciplinary action, or even civil and/or 
criminal penalties. But not all professions have ethical 
considerations that are binding. Some professions, such as 
journalism, follow their ethical norms on a purely voluntary 
basis. Sometimes, this means that there is no effective legal 
recourse for the violation of these voluntary, non-binding 
ethical guidelines, even when the violation of these ethical 
norms have unintended, serious, and sometimes deadly 
consequences. 
But, conversely, there are times when the violation of the 
privacy of an individual will be actionable. As practitioners and 
interpreters of the law, we must stand ready to provide justice 
for that individual. 
 
87. See id. 
13
